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INTRODUCTION

In May 2007, the United States Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly I and sent shockwaves throughout the federal civil justice system.
Reversing the Second Circuit, the Court held that an antitrust complaint that
alleged mere parallel behavior among rival telecommunications companies,
coupled with stray averments of agreement that amounted merely to legal
conclusions, failed as a matter of law to state a claim for conspiracy in violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act and had been properly dismissed by the trial court.3
The Court then proceeded to (1) redefine the concept of notice pleading by
"retiring" the half-century old "no set of facts" standard4 that it had annunciated
in Conley v. Gibson;5 (2) articulate a new "plausibility" standard against which6
courts;
to measure complaints, thereby raising the bar for pleadings in federal
and (3) remind district courts that they are gatekeepers, tasked with the
responsibility of screening complaints at the motion to dismiss stage-in order to
assure that speculative or insubstantial claims that are expensive for parties to

litigate and costly for courts to administer 7 are not allowed to "immerse the
parties in the discovery swamp-'that Serbonian bog... where armies whole
have sunk."' 8 The upshot of Twombly is that defendants should be spared the
rigors of discovery "unless the complaint provides enough information to enable

1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. See Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower
Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852 (2008) ("Twombly's
seismic impact is apparent when one considers that in the first six months after the decision was
handed down, it was cited in more than 2,000 district court opinions and 150 circuit court
opinions.").
3.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-49, 553.
4.
Id. at 562-63 ("Conley's 'no set of facts' language.., has earned its retirement. The
phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with
the allegations in the complaint.").
5.
335 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief." (emphasis added)).
6.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566 ("Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.").
7.
See id. at 558-59 ("Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of
discovery in cases with no 'reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal
relevant evidence' to support a § 1 claim." (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)) (alteration in original)).
8.
In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 138 (Alastair Fowler ed., 2d ed. 1998)) (discussing Twombly's
impact of preventing burdensome discovery for claims that should be dismissed), cert. denied sub
nom. Cellco P'ship v. Morris, 131 S. Ct. 2165 (2011).
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defendant to
an inference that the suit has sufficient merit to warrant putting the
9
the burden of responding to at least a limited discovery demand."

Twombly has triggered an avalanche
.... of motions
1
10 to dismiss, which, in turn,
has generated thousands of judicial opImons; -some

of them knee-jerk

reactions," and others, more thoughtful. 12 It also has generated a plethora of
academic commentary,' 3 much of it negative.14 Legislation has been introduced

9.
Id. at 625.
10. See McMahon, supra note 2, at 852.
11. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. MD 06-1775(JG)(VVP),
2008 WL 5958061, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008) (recommending that the defendants' motions to
dismiss plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims be granted with leave to replead), modified, No. 06-MD1775(JG)(VVP), 2009 WL 3443405, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009) (disagreeing with the
magistrate judge's recommendation and ruling that the plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims were
sufficiently pleaded under Twombly).
12. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d at 626 (analyzing the dangers of
"misapplying the Twombly standard" and how it could create severe harm); Starr v. Sony BMG
Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 322 (2d Cir. 2010) (analyzing thoroughly the defendants' actions and
how they compare to the Twombly standard), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 901 (2011); Austen v.
Catterton Partners V, LP, 709 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (D. Conn. 2010) (emphasizing the need for the
court to continue to utilize good judgment and common sense when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions
after Twombly and Jqbal).
13. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 849-50 (2010) (examining the effects of Twombly
and how Iqbal widened the scope of these effects); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, PleadingRules, and
the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 876 (2009) ("[This article] views Twombly
not so much as a pleading decision but rather as a court access decision, one that addresses a general
problem of institutional design: how best to prevent undesirable lawsuits from entering the court
system."); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleadingand the Dilemmas of "General Rules," 2009 WiS. L. REV.
535, 560 (2009) ("[Twombly] is an invitation to the lower federal courts to screen out complaints in
disfavored classes of cases, whether they are disfavored because of their perceived discovery
burdens or for some other reason."); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests,
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) (noting the "new and foggy test" that
Twombly and Iqbal have provided); Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading
Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 443 (2010) (discussing how the discrete changes caused by
Twombly and Iqbal have challenged the American system of liberal pleadings); Scott Dodson,
PleadingStandards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 135 (2007)
(discussing the implications that Twombly will have on future pleadings); Richard A. Epstein, Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 62 (2007) (noting that the analysis behind Twombly is flawed); Edward
A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474-75 (2010) ("[This
article] emphasizes Twombly's connection to prior law and suggests ways in which it can be
tamed."); Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck, & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial:
Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141,141 (2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf ("[Debating] whether this plausibility
standard is a proper 'recalibration' of the pleading rules or an illegitimate 'innovation' and whether
Congress would be wise to overrule it."); Richard M. Steuer, Plausible Pleading: Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 861, 875 (2008) ("Twombly increases the burden by
replacing the 'no set of facts test' with a 'show me the facts' test."); Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of
Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 893, 895-96 (2008)
(acknowledging the difficulties that lie ahead for the lower federal courts after Twombly); Z.W.
Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural

Published by Scholar Commons, 2011

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 97

to overturn Twombly and to restore the Conley v. Gibson standard.15 Twombly

was also a major agenda item at the 2010 Conference on Civil Rules held at
Duke University School of Law on May 10-11, 2010.16

Unquestionably, the

Twombly decision is flawed on many levels:
1. It redefines federal pleading standards generally in order to
address perceived problems specific to antitrust and similar
complex litigation, including costly and time consuming
pretrial discovery.17

Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2008) (considering if Twombly should apply to state
claims); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008)
(introducing a discussion on the response to Twombly in the legal community and an empirical
study that examines the results of Twombly); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Dismisses a 9/11
Detainee's Civil Lawsuit, FINDLAW (May 20, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/2009
0520.html ("Twombly led to considerable confusion in the lower federal courts.").
14. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 13, at 560 ("Twombly's most obvious and immediate
consequence has been enormous confusion and transaction costs as a result of uncertainty about the
requirements it imposes and its scope of application."); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 13, at 859
("Twombly and lqbal have introduced a wild card, a factor of substantial instability, at the threshold
stage of civil process through which all litigation must pass."); Ward, supra note 13, at 918 (listing
five difficult questions for the courts to resolve after Twombly).
15. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S.4054, 111 th Cong. (2010); Open Access
to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111 th Cong. (2009). Both of these bills would overrule Twombly
and restore the status quo ante. See S. 4054 § 3; H.R. 4115 § 2. But see John Thorne, Congress
Overturning Twombly and lqbal Would be the Real Revolution in Pleading, METRO. CORP.
COUNS., Sept. 2010, at 8 ("[1]n the struggle to devise better language than the Supreme Court has
used in explaining the pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the drafters of these bills have ended
up proposing-perhaps unintentionally-new and fairly incomprehensible standards that would
lead to chaos in the courts and frivolous cases crowding out meritorious ones.").
16. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & THE COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1, 6 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010%20report.pdf.
17. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). This approach is curiously at
odds with the Court's consistent rulings that court-made pleading rules should not be used to
address substantive policy concerns. Only weeks before Twombly was decided, the Court reiterated
these views:
In a series of recent cases, we have explained that courts should generally not depart
from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns.
Thus, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163 (1993), we unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals for imposing a
heightened pleading standard in § 1983 suits against municipalities. We explained that
"[plerhaps if [the] Rules ...were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under §
1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement .... But that is a result
which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation." Id., at 168.
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), we unanimously reversed the
Court of Appeals for requiring employment discrimination plaintiffs to specifically allege
the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination. We explained that "the Federal
Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination
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2.

In place of Conley's "no set of facts standard"-a measuring

stick that the Supreme Court consistently adhered to for half a
century in passing on complaints at the motion to dismiss
stage' -the

Court substituted a "foggy"' 9 plausibility test,2 °

which is ever murkier in the wake of its subsequent attempts at
3.

4.

clarification.2 '
The decision shifts the focus of the court in ruling on a motion
to dismiss from whether a claim exists, to whether a claim is
properly alleged in the complaint, thereby re-introducing into
federal practice the very technical pleading requirements that
22
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to eliminate.
As a result, Twombly appears to be at odds with the basic thrust
of the Federal Rules to encourage trials on the merits over

suits," and a "requirement of greater specificity for particular claims" must be obtained
by amending the Federal Rules. Id., at 515 (citing Leatherman). And just last Term, in
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006), we unanimously rejected a proposal that §
1983 suits challenging a method of execution must identify an acceptable alternative:
"Specific pleading requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and not, as a general rule, through case-by-case determinations of the federal courts." Id.,
at 582 (citing Swierkiewicz).
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212-13 (2007) (alteration in original).
18. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
19. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 13, at 823.
20. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
21. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-54 (2009) (attempting to clarify
the Twombly plausibility test).
22. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 68, at 466-67 (7th ed. 2011) ("The keystone of the system of procedure embodied in the rules is
Rule 8 .... These provisions state that technical forms of pleading are not required, that pleadings
are to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice .... ). Dissenting in Twombly, Justice
Stevens observed:
Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the idea was not to keep
litigants out of court but rather to keep them in. The merits of a claim would be sorted
out during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible of trial.
See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 ("The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the
starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on
the merits of a claim."). Charles E. Clark, the "principal draftsman" of the Federal Rules,
put it thus:
"Experience has shown ... that we cannot expect the proof of the case to be made
through the pleadings, and that such proof is really not their function. We can expect a
general statement distinguishing the case from all others, so that the manner and form of
trial and remedy expected are clear, and so that a permanent judgment will result." The
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy
Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A. B. A. J. 976, 977
(1937).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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pretrial dispositions, and it seems to embrace the common law
philosophy that trials are to be avoided.23

5. The Court pointedly ignores the many management tools
available to the courts under the 24
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure short of dismissal of claims.

6. The opinion suggests that federal trial judges are not effective
pretrial managers.
7. Yet, these very same judges are encouraged to dismiss claims
on the merits, perhaps without the benefit of pretrial
discovery.26

8. The Court offers no suggestions on how a plaintiff is expected
to meet the plausibility test when information crucial to its case,
such as the time and place of conspiratorial meetings and the
nature and extent of any agreements, is in the exclusive control
of the defendant.2 7

On the other hand, Twombly is not without its supporters. 28 They view
Twombly as "unremarkable" in requiring plaintiffs to plead sufficient facts to
make a claim plausible. 29 They also maintain that Twombly "did little more than

restate and apply the federal pleading standard that lower courts had long been
implementing.'3° The fact is that lower courts, with the possible exception of
pro se cases, have never applied Conley literally.32 The frequency with which

23. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that "even if there is
abundant evidence that the allegation is untrue, directing that the case be dismissed without even
looking at any of that evidence marks a fundamental-and unjustified-change in the character of
the pretrial practice"); see generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 22, at 466-77 (discussing the
theory underlying the modem pleading standard).
24. See generally Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedureand
the Courts, 82 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 877, 883-89 (2008) (discussing other means of controlling pretrial costs such as discovery reform).
25. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
26. See id. at 558 ("Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust
complaint in advance of discovery ...but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust
discovery can be quite expensive.").
27. See Cavanagh, supra note 24, at 892 (recommending that plaintiffs be given access to
defendant's records before the court grants a motion to dismiss).
28. E.g., Thorne, supra note 15, at 8 (encouraging corporate counsel to contact Congress in
support of Twombly).
29. Id. ("Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly ...[is] unremarkable in requiring that before a
lawsuit can proceed to expensive discovery, the plaintiff must plead a valid cause of action based on
facts (not conclusions) that make the claim plausible in the circumstances.").
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (granting the pro se
plaintiff the benefit of what he reasonably intended in his claims).
32. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 ("Conley has never been interpreted literally." (quoting Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984))).
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courts grant motions to dismiss is a testament to this fact.33 Rather, as noted in
Iqbal, the courts have always decided
motions to dismiss on the basis of "judicial
34
experience and common sense."
As the fourth anniversary of the Twombly decision has come to pass, a new

landscape is emerging, and the time for venting is over. Twombly is the law of
the land; and the Supreme Court, having reaffirmed that decision in Iqbal,35 is

not likely to shift course. 36 Nor is the Advisory Committee likely to act in light
of the Federal Judicial Center's March 2011 empirical study, which concludes

that, although there was an increase in the number of motions to dismiss filed
between 2006 and 2010, there was in general "no increase in the rate of grants of
motions to dismiss without leave to amend. ,37 That study suggests that the
lower courts have been pragmatic-not dogmatic-in construing Twombly and

Iqbal;38 and as the dust from those decisions continues to settle, it has become
increasingly apparent that the parade of horribles feared by critics has not
materialized, 39 making the likelihood of congressional action even more remote.
In short, the legal community is going to have to live with the Twombly holding,

and probably for a long time. Still, the scope of Twombly remains unsettled and

33. See, e.g., STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MOTIONS TO DISMISS
INFORMATION ON COLLECTION OF DATA 6 (2010), available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Motions%20to%20Dismiss_0427 O.pdf (displaying success rates for
motions to dismiss from 2007-2010, pre- and post-Twombly and Iqbal); see also Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
553, 599 (2010) (suggesting, through empirical evidence, that courts granted motions to dismiss
much more often than was thought under Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1956)).
34. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143,
157-58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)); see Thorne, supra note 15, at 8.
35. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for
'all civil actions."' (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
36. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in high profile cases from the
Seventh Circuit and the Second Circuit. See Cellco P'ship v. Morris, 131 S. Ct. 2165 (2011); Sony
Music Entm't v. Starr, 131 S. Ct. 901 (2011). At the same time, the Court has made it clear that on
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the question is not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, "but whether [the] complaint was sufficient to cross the federal court's
threshold," and that to survive at the leading stage, a complaint need not contain "an exposition of
[the] legal argument." Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011); see also Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1325 (2011) (holding that the claims were
adequately pled but refusing to answer at this stage if the plaintiffs can prove their allegations).
37. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL, at vii (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsflookup/
motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf; see also Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law
Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules Committee and Standing Rules Committee 4 (Dec.
15, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ruleslqbal memo_
121510. pdf ("[C]ase law to date does not appear to indicate that lqbal has dramatically changed the
application of the standards used to determine pleading sufficiency.").
38. CECIL ET AL., supra note 37, at 2-3 ('The courts of appeals have since reversed a number
of the early district court decisions and have issued a growing body of case law that requires district
courts to be cautious and context-specific in applying Twombly and lqbal." (footnotes omitted)).
39. CECIL ET AL., supra note 37, at 21 (finding no significant increase in the rate at which
motions to dismiss were granted across the majority of case types).
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"[p]leading standards in federal litigation are in ferment. ''4 This article will
explore how trial courts can adhere to Twombly's core concerns-not allowing
speculative claims to open the door to potentially costly discovery and drain
judicial resources-by dismissing those complaints "that merely create[ I a
suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action,"41 while at the same time

remaining true to the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
meritorious litigants shall 'have
their day in court and that pleadings "be
42
construed so as to do justice.
II.

PROLOGUE:

THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE ADVENT OF NOTICE PLEADING

As Arthur Miller has observed, "[h]istory matters, 43 and because history
matters, any analysis of Twombly must begin with a discussion of the origins of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the changes in practice and procedure
that the Federal Rules effectuated. In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules
Enabling Act authorizing the United States Supreme Court to fashion uniform
rules of practice and procedure in the federal courts. 44 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were thereafter promulgated by the Supreme Court on December
20, 193745 and became effective on September 16, 1938, pursuant to the Rules

40. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 2010). Notably, the
courts of appeals, in reversing earlier trial court dismissals, have begun to exhibit a cautious and
nuanced approach to Twombly and lqbal. See, e.g., Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v.
Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2011) (reversing the motion to dismiss because
the district court misapplied Twombly); L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 431-35
(2d Cir. 2011) (concluding that the claims were plausible after a detailed plausibility analysis);
Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's claim that the defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); Braden v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court's dismissal of an
employee's class action complaint against his employer alleging a violation of fiduciary duties
imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act); see also CECIL ET AL., supra note 37,
at 2-3 n.6 (listing cases in which the courts of appeals reversed district court decisions granting
motions to dismiss).
41. Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1216, at 236 (3d ed. 2004)).
42. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(e).
43. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (2010).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
practice and procedure in the federal courts were governed by the rule of the state in which the
federal court was located pursuant to the Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196,
197.
See Conformity Act of 1872, available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/conflicts/
confact.html. In 1912, the Federal Rules of Equity were adopted, providing for uniform practice
and procedure in federal equity cases. See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United
States 226 U.S. 649 (1912). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "were based on the 1913 Federal
Rules of Equity." Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex
Litigations, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1,5 (2009).
45. Orders re Rules of Procedure, 302 U.S. 783 (1937).
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Enabling Act after Congress adjourned without enacting an adverse legislation.
The new Federal Rules introduced a number of dramatic changes in federal
practice and procedure: the merger of law and equity, 47 the elimination of the

common law forms of action,4 the limitation of the number of pleadings to
49
three, liberal procedures for joinder of claims 50 and parties, 51 and the
introduction of pretrial discovery.52 Perhaps the most significant change,
however, was the introduction of simplified pleading standards to facilitate trial
of meritorious claims.53 The drafters rejected the common law model with its
highl technical pleading rules and endless exchanges of paper designed to avoid
trial. They also rejected the code pleading models and their heavy emphasis on
pleading facts sufficient to make out a cause of action.55 The drafters felt that
both models tended to focus the court's attention on how a claim had been
pleaded instead of the nature of the claim itself and to reward the party whose
attorney possessed superior 56technical skills rather than the party having the
meritorious claim or defense.

Instead, the simplified pleading system chosen by the drafters deemphasized the role of the complaint and answer in the action.57 Rule 8(a)(2)
requires only that the complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief., 58 The goal of this simplified
pleading standard was to insure that meritorious claims would have their day in
court and that claims would not be dismissed simply because they were inartfully

46. See WRIGHT & KANE,supra note 22, § 62, at 429-30.
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
48. See id.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (complaint, answer and reply, if ordered by the court).
50. FED. R. Civ.P. 18.
51. FED. R. Civ.P. 19-20.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
54. Miller, supra note 43, at 3-4; See Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage
Complaint Pleadingas a Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1191, 1202
(2010).
55. Campbell, supra note 54, at 1202; Miller, supra note 43, at 3; see Ward, supra note 13, at
896-97 (criticizing common law pleading and code pleading).
56. See Miller, supra note 43, at 4-5; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 22, § 68, at 467-68;
Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REv. 517, 518 (1925)
("[T]he purpose especially emphasized has varied from time to time. Thus in common law pleading
especial emphasis was placed upon the issue-formulating function of pleading; under the earlier
code pleading like emphasis was placed upon stating the material, ultimate facts in the pleadings;
while at the present time the emphasis seems to have shifted to the notice function of pleading.").
57. See Miller, supra note 43, at 5; Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational
Pleading in the Modem World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of
Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1107, 1118 (2010) ("A guiding policy behind
simplified pleading was that it would be more efficient, in terms of both cost and expediency, to
resolve disputes using discovery rather than successive technical pleadings.").
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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drafted or because the plaintiff did not allege in the complaint each and every
element of the cause of action to be proved at trial.59
The function of the complaint, with one notable exception involving the
pleading of fraud claims, 60 was to provide the adversary with notice of the claim
or defense and the grounds upon which it depends. 61 This simplified pleading
62
regimen became popularly known as notice pleading, although the drafters
themselves declined to embrace that terminology. 63 Claims could be described

generally; it was unnecessary to plead every element of the cause of action to be
drafters eschewed the phrase "cause of action" in favor of
proven at trial. 64 The
"claim for relief., 65 The details of the claims or defenses could be fleshed out
through pretrial discovery. 66 To illustrate this barebones pleading regimen, the
67
drafters included several sample complaints in the Appendix of Forms.
Presumably, complaints modeled on these forms would survive a motion to
dismiss. 68 Consistent with the approach of the drafters, the Supreme Court in
Conley v. Gibson held that a complaint must contain notice of the claim as well
as the grounds upon which it depends. 69 Further, Conley held that a complaint

challenged for insufficiency pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should not be dismissed at
the pleading stage "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
70
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.",
Moreover, the courts have been especially solicitous of pro se plaintiffs and have
demonstrated a marked reluctance to dismiss pro se complaints at the pleadings
stage.71

59. See Miller, supra note 43, at 4-5 ("[Tlhe Federal Rules created a system that relied on
plain language and minimized procedural traps, with trial by jury as the gold standard for
determining a case's merits."); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 22, § 68, at 466-67.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
61. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 22, § 68, at 467.
62. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
63. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 22, at 471 (citing Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546,
550-51 (1961); Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435,
450-51 (1958)).
64. See Miller, supra note 43, at 4-5.
65. Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the FederalRules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 187 (1957-58).
66. See Miller, supra note 43, at 4 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48).
67. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P., Form 12 (illustrating a form complaint for negligence).
68. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007); Hamilton v. Palm, 621
F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The forms in the Appendix [to the Rules] suffice under these
rules .... " (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 84)).
69. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
70. Id. at 45-46.
71. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally
construed' ... and 'a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."' (citation omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))).
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While the notice pleading concept was not without its detractors, 72 it is fair
to say that the transition from fact pleading to notice pleading went smoothly, at
least initially.73 Concern about notice pleading began to mount as litigation grew
more complex and more costly in ways that the original drafters could not have
foreseen.
Critics argued that the Federal Rules had shifted the litigation
playing field decidedly in favor of plaintiffs.75 A threadbare complaint could

force a defendant to spend millions of dollars on discovery, irrespective of the
merits of the underlying claim. 76 Faced with such costs, a defendant would have
little choice from an economic perspective other77than to settle the matter, even if
the underlying claims were of little or no merit.
A 1955 Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedures resisted calls to
change pleading standards. 78 It did, however, take other steps to reduce

litigation costs.'9 A package of amendments was introduced in 1983 to curb
baseless claims and to police the discovery process more effectively. First, that
package contained a revitalized Rule 11 in 1983 to provide for mandatory
sanction where a claim or defense is adjudged to have been baseless. 8' Second,
it amended Rule 16 to make clear that a court's managerial powers extended to
the discovery phase, as well as to the trial phase, of a case, and that failure to
participate meaningfully in pretrial conferences would lead to sanctions. 82 Third,
it amended Rule 26 to provide that discovery must be proportional to the needs

72. See Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule
(8)(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1952) (reporting on the Ninth
Circuit's request to return to the code pleading standard).
73. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 57, at 1118-19 (noting the reasons why the drafters'
decision to simplify pleading in the 1930s was justified).
74. See The Place of the Pleadings in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the "Big Case," 23
F.R.D. 430, 434-35 (1958); Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) ('The modern 'notice' theory of pleading is not sufficient when employed in a
complaint under the anti-trust laws."); Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for
Amendment of Rule (8)(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 255 (1952);
see also Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9
NEV. L.J. 1, 18 (2008).
75. See, e.g., Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971)
(suggesting that notice pleading is like legalized blackmail because it forces defendants to settle).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Campbell, supra note 74, at 18.
79. See id. (citing ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICr
COURTS 18-19 (1955), reprinted in 12A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, app. F at 665 (3d ed. 2004)).

80. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through Local
Rules, 30 VILL. L. REV. 767, 768-69 (1985) (discussing the impact on discovery that the 1983
amendments had).
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983).
82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1983).
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of the case and to sanction discovery that is redundant, not cost effective, or
disproportional to the needs of the case. 83 Subsequently, in 1993 the Advisory
Committee amended the discovery rules to impose presumptive numerical limits
on interrogatories 84 and depositions. 85 Fourth, the 2000 Amendments to the
Federal Rules limited the scope of attorney-initiated discovery."

Fifth, the 2006

Amendments to the Federal Rules 8 provided a framework for reining in
potentially costly electronic discovery.
Nevertheless, concerns about notice pleading persisted and found
sympathetic ears in some appellate courts. For example, the Second Circuit in
Ostrer v. Aronwald88 imposed a specificity in pleading requirement89-akin to

Rule 9(b) 90 -for civil rights cases.

That approach, however, was short-lived.

The Supreme Court in Leatherman,92 and subsequently in Swierkiewicz, 93 ruled

that courts may not fashion their own rules of particularity in pleading for
specific types of cases. Any change would have to come through the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 94 As noted above, 95 the 1955 Advisory Committee

was disinclined to act on pleadings, and criticism of Conley persisted in the
lower courts.9 6 The Supreme Court chose to re-enter the fray by accepting
certiorari in Twombly.97

83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (1983).
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (1993) (25 interrogatories).
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (1993) (10 depositions per side).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) (attorney-initiated discovery limited in scope to a "claim
or defense").
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B), 26(b)(2), 34(a)(1)(A) (2006).
88. 567 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977).
89. Id. at 553 ("This court has repeatedly held that complaints containing only 'conclusory,'
vague,' or 'general allegations' of a conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights will be
dismissed. Diffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by specific instances
of misconduct. In this case, appellants' unsupported allegations, which fail to specify in detail the
factual basis necessary to enable appellees intelligently to prepare their defense, will not suffice to
sustain a claim of governmental conspiracy to deprive appellants of their constitutional rights."
(citations omitted)).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
91. Oster, 567 F.2d at 552.
92. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168-69 (1993).
93. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514-15 (2002).
94. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
95. See supra text accompanying note 78.
96. See, e.g., Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989); Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Sutliff, Inc. v.
Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984)) ("Conley has never been interpreted literally.");
see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685
(1998) ("Conley v. Gibson turned Rule 8 on its head by holding that a claim is insufficient only if
the insufficiency appears from the pleading itself.").
97. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 548 U.S. 903 (2006).
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THE TWOMBLY TRILOGY: EXACTLY WHAT DID TWOMBLY DO?

A. Twombly
The Twombly case arose against the backdrop of the breakup of AT&T in
1984.98 That year, AT&T entered into a consent decree with the federal
government, and agreed, among other things, to divest its ownership of
telephone companies providing local phone services. 99 The consent decree
created seven entities, denominated regional Bell operating companies, which
These companies
were granted monopolies to provide local phone services.
0
were barred from competing in long distance services.' ' Thereafter, mergers
reduced the number of regional operating companies from seven to four.1" 2
That state of affairs was short-lived. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,103 which, among other things, removed
barriers to entry of the market for local telephone services.' 0 4

In order to

stimulate competition in local markets, Congress authorized the erstwhile
monopolistic regional operating companies, referred to in Twombly as incumbent
local exchange carriers ("ILECs"), to compete in each other's territories.105 In
addition, the Act required ILECs to share their technology with companies,
referred to by Twombly as competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"),
seeking to enter the newly created competitive markets for local telephone
services.' °6 Notwithstanding the Act, little changed in the local exchange
markets. °7 The ILECs did not seem interested in competing with each other,
and they were slow to make technology available to CLECs, frustrating the
statutory goal of opening up local telephone service to competition.•08
Twombly, a consumer of local phone and high speed internet services,

commenced a putative class action under § 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging that
the ILECs (1) had conspired not to compete in each other's territories; and (2)
had agreed to limit the growth opportunities of CLECs by, inter alia, limiting
access to their networks, overbilling, and undermining relations between CLECs

98. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007).
99. Id. at550n..
100. Id.
101. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 2I, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313
F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))
[hereinafter Complaint].
102. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 n.i (citing Complaint, supra note 101, 21); see Verizon
Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 422, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
103. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 251 (2006)).
104. Id. § 253, 110 Stat. at 70.
105. Id. § 251, 110 Stat. at 61-66.
106. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549 (citing Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,402 (2004)).
107. Verizon Commc'ns, 540 U.S. at 404.
108. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 (citing Complaint, supra note 101, 147).
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and their customers. 109 The complaint contained no specific factual allegations
of any agreements among the ILECs." 0 Rather, it averred that the ILECs
pursued a parallel course of conduct and then characterized that conduct as
conspiratorial.1 1' Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it
was defective because proof of mere conscious parallelism, without more, is
insufficient as a matter of law to establish an illegal conspiracy; and, therefore,
allegations of conscious parallelism render a complaint similarly defective.112
Defendants further argued that in order to succeed at trial, plaintiffs would have
to adduce evidence of agreement beyond parallel conduct-so-called
plus
1 13
factors-and their failure to allege plus factors was fatal to their claim.
The trial court agreed with defendants and granted their motion to
dismiss. 114 The Second Circuit reversed, rejecting the trial court's attempt to
impose summary judgment standards at the motion to dismiss stage. 115 The
Second Circuit concluded that the defendants had fair notice of the plaintiffs'
conspiracy claim and that-under Swierkiewicz, the trial court could not impose a
particularity
in pleading requirement in cases falling outside the scope of Rule
116
9(b).

The Supreme Court reversed and ordered dismissal of the complaint. 117 In
so doing, it steered a middle course between the decisions below. The High
Court declined to endorse the trial court's view that summary judgment
standards apply at the motion to dismiss stage. 1 8 It also rejected the Second
Circuit's view that under Swierkiewicz and Conley, the claims must be upheld
and could proceed to discovery. 119 Rather, the Court based its decision on its

construction of Rule 8(a)(2), explaining that "we do not require heightened fact
pleading of specifics,120but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face."'
In so holding, the Court acknowledged that the Federal Rules had
significantly liberalized pleading standards and further, reaffirming the holding
in Swierkiewicz, that courts are not free to adopt ad hoc heightened pleading
standards. 121The Court then proceeded to redefine notice pleading in terms 1of
22
the specific language of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

109. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id.at 552 (citing Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79).
113. See id.at 553 (citing Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
114. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d. at 189.
115. Twombly, 425 F.3d. at 119.
116. Id. at 107.
117. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553.
118. See id. at 569 n.14 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)).
119. See id. at 570.

120. Id.
121. See id. at 570.
122. Id. at 557.
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The Court acknowledged that the Federal Rules eased pleading requirements that
had been in effect at common law and under the Codes; but at the same time
stated that it would be a mistake to suggest "that the Federal Rules somehow
dispensed with the pleading of facts altogether. 1 23 Rather, the Federal Rules
merely relieve a plaintiff of the need to "set out in detail the facts upon which he
bases his claim."1 24 The Court further opined that factual allegations in the
complaint are critical to a plaintiff s claim.
To satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must provide notice of the plaintiffs
claim and the grounds upon which the claim rests. 126 To establish grounds
sufficient to make a showing that it is entitled to relief, a pleader must aver
"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do."' 127 Nor are courts "bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation."' 1 8 The facts alleged "must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. ' 129 It is not enough
to allege facts "that merely create[ ] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of
action."' 3 ° The complaint must assert plausible grounds to infer wrongdoing.' 3 1
The Court emphasized that simply requiring plausible grounds from which to
infer wrongdoing "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
' Rather, "it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
stage. ",32
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing]."' 33
Applying the plausibility standard to the complaint before it, the Court in
Twombly held that the claim of conspiracy consisting of "an allegation of parallel
conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice"'134 because parallel
' 35
conduct itself is not unlawful and "could just as well be independent action.
In so ruling, the Court pointedly departed from its fifty year old ruling in Conley
v. Gibson. 36 The Court concluded that Conley had long been misconstrued by
lower courts and that the "no set of facts" language "described the breadth of
opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum
standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint's survival."' 37 Pointing to

123. Id.at 555 n.3.
124. Id.(quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
125. Id. ("Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant
could satisfy the requirement of providing not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also
grounds' on which the claim rests.").
126. Id.at 555.
127. Id.
128. Id.(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
129. Id.
130. ld. (second alteration in original) (quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at 236).
131. Id.at 556.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.at 557.
136. Id.at 563.
137. Id.
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criticism leveled at Conley by the lower courts,38the Court also suggested that
judicial support for Conley had long ago eroded. 1
Nevertheless, the contours of the plausibility standard enunciated by the
Court are vague, and the Court in Twombly provides little guidance.139 It is clear
that the Court intended to raise the bar for pleadings in federal courts. How
much higher the bar has been raised and how broadly the Twombly holding
should be applied remains unclear.140 A fundamental problem with the Twombly
standard is that the Court "defines plausibility in terms of what it is not." 141 It is
not a particularity requirement but rather "simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement."142 On the other hand, "it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully."'143 But it does not require "heightened fact
pleading of specifics."' 144 We are left with a sort of Goldilocks approach:
probability (too much); possibility (too little); plausibility (just right).
Moreover, the Court's choice of terminology is unfortunate. As Judge
Posner points out, "plausibility, probability and possibility overlap."' 45 True, on

138. Id. at 562.
139. As Judge Posner pointed out: "Twombly is a recent decision, and its scope unsettled
(especially in light of its successor, Iqbal-from which the author of the majority opinion in
Twombly dissented; and two of the Justices who participated in those cases have since retired)." In
re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Mark Anderson &
Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error,20 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 1 (2010) ("How the plausibility standard from lqbal and Twombly should operate in
the real world is poorly understood.").
140. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit
underscored the difficulty of reconciling the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of notice pleading while
at the same time adopting the plausibility standard:
It is by now well established that a plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on
paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that some has happened
to her that might be redressed by the law. The question with which courts are still
struggling is how much higher the Supreme Court meant to set the bar, when it decided
not only Twombly, but also [Erickson and lqbalI. This is not an easy question to answer,
as the thoughtful dissent from this opinion demonstrates. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court has adopted a "plausibility" standard, but on the other hand, it has insisted that it is
not requiring fact pleading, nor is it adopting a single pleading standard to replace Rule 8,
Rule 9, and specialized regimes like the one in the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act ("PSLRA").
Id. (citations omitted).
141. In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
142. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
143. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
144. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
145. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010). Judge Posner
goes on to say:
Probability runs the gamut from a zero likelihood to a certainty. What is impossible has a
zero likelihood of occurring and what is plausible has a moderately high likelihood of
occurring. The fact that the allegations undergirding a claim could be true is no longer
enough to save a complaint from being dismissed; the complaint must establish a
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a spectrum with possible on one end and probable on the other end, plausible fits
somewhere in between. What Twombly appears to require is a complaint that
establishes a "nonnegligle probability" of a valid claim. 46 Some insight as to
the intended breadth of Twombly can be gained from reviewing the rationale of
the Court. The Court's reasoning in dismissing the antitrust claim is closely tied
to the substantive nature of the case. The Court expressed concern about the
high cost of discovery in antitrust cases and the fundamental unfairness of
forcing defendants to incur these costs on the basis of generalized, and perhaps
speculative, allegations of wrongdoing in the pleadings. 147 The Court also took
the view that the courts could not control the content of the pleadings or
discovery and that dismissal at the pleading stage was the preferred vehicle for
handling such cases.148
B. Erickson
Erickson v. Pardus149 was decided two weeks after Twombly but with a very

different outcome and a very different rationale. Erickson was a pro se civil
rights action by a prisoner against prison officials in which the prisoner claimed
150
that officials unlawfully denied him treatment for his hepatitis C condition.
The plaintiff claimed that the prison which had been treating his disease ceased
treating him after wrongfully concluding that he had used contraband drugs. 151
On the authority of Twombly, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.151
The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the complaint failed to allege harm
caused by discontinuance of the treatment as opposed to harm caused by the
progression of the disease. 153 In other words, defendants challenged not the
claim itself but rather how the claim had been pleaded.
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the complaint.154 Citing Twombly
and Conley, the Court held that a complaint need only provide notice of the
claim and its grounds; the detail demanded by the trial court was unnecessary
under the Federal Rules.' 55 The Court also criticized the Court of Appeals'
"departure from the liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2)" in pro se

nonnegligible probability that the claim is valid; but the probability need not be as great
as such terms as "preponderance of the evidence" connote.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-58.
148. Id. at 559.
149. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
150. Id. at 90.
151. Id. at91.
152. Id. at 92.
153. Id. at 93 (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 198 F. App'x 694, 698 (10th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 551
U.S. 89 (2007)).
154. Id. at 94-95.
155. Id. at 93-94 (citing Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).
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cases.156 Erickson sheds some light on the holding in Twombly. First, it makes
clear that the Court in Twombly accepted notice pleading and did not intend to
adopt a fact pleading regimen in the federal courts generally. 157 The thrust of the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint was that the claim was improperly
pleaded, not that a claim did not exist, and the Supreme Court rejected that
reasoning. 1 8 Second, Erickson, in reaffirming the traditionally generous
treatment of pro se complaints, 159 demonstrates vividly that Twombly did not
intend to undo some seventy years of case law in its entirety. Simply put,
Erickson suggests that Twombly's plausibility standard has flexibility and is not
to be construed in a wooden manner.
C. Iqbal
In May 2009, the Supreme Court revisited pleading standards in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal. 6° The plaintiff, Iqbal, a Muslim from Pakistan who had been arrested in
the United States in the wake of the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and
who had subsequently pled guilty to defrauding the United States, brought a civil
rights action against federal officials including the Attorney General of the
United States and the Director of the FBI.161 Iqbal alleged that the defendants
knowingly condoned a discriminatory policy which led to "harsh conditions of
162 The lower
confinement on account of his race,
63 religion or national origin.'
1
courts had upheld the complaint.
Reversing, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the complaint was
deficient as a matter of law under Twombly. 164 The Iqbal decision reaffirms
Twombly and attempts to add flesh to the skeletal Twombly analysis. As a
threshold matter, the Court rejected arguments that Twombly should be limited to
antitrust cases or complex litigation generally, and held that Twombly applied to
all federal complaints.t65 The Court then underscored "[t]wo working principles
[that] underlie our decision in Twombly." 166 First, on a motion to dismiss, only
well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true; conclusory allegations

156. Id. at 94.
157. Id. at 93-94.
158 Id. at 94.

159. See id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). This is not to suggest that
pro se complaints automatically survive motions to dismiss. Where claims in pro se complaints are
implausible, they may be dismissed under Twombly. See Vargas v. Wughalter, 380 F. App'x 110,
111 (2d Cir. 2010); Blakely v. Wells, 380 F. App'x 6,8 (2d Cir. 2010).
160. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
161. Id. at 1942.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1950-51, 54.
165. Id. at 1953 ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard 'for all civil
actions,' and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike." (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1)).
166. Id. at 1949-50.
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are not entitled to a presumption of truth. 167 Second, to survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must state "a plausible claim for relief."'' 68 Determining
plausibility is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense. ' '

69

The pleader need not, at the

motion to dismiss stage, establish the probabilityof wrongdoing; but at the same
time, allegations that raise only the mere possibility of misconduct are
insufficient as a matter of law to establish "that the pleader is entitled to
relief." 170 Rather, the allegations must be sufficient to "allow[] the court to draw
the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
7
alleged."'1 '

Applying these working principles, the Court first weeded out conclusory
allegations that it deemed to be nothing more than "formulaic recitation of the
elements" of the plaintiff's constitutionally based claim.' 72

The Court, after

reviewing the well-pleaded facts, ruled that the complaint failed Twombly's
plausibility standard. 173 Here, the Court found that the complaint raised no more

than the possibility of wrongdoing. 74 While acknowledging that certain
allegations were consistent with the plaintiffs claims of unlawful conduct, the
Court pointed out that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Attorney General had
ample reason to detain Arab Muslims illegally present within the United States
who might be potentially linked to terrorists.'

Given the "obvious alternative

explanation" for the plaintiffs detention, the Court found that claims of
discrimination and the purposeful discrimination he asked the Court to infer
were not plausible. 76 Even if the claims were plausible, the complaint was still

167. Id. (citing Bell Atil. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
168. Id. at 1950 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
169. Id. (citing lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009)).
170. Id. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
171. Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
172. Id. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
173. Id. at 1952.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1951.
176. Id. at 1951-52 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). In L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy,
LLC, 647 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2011), Judge Scheindlin observed that compliance with Iqbal may be
easier said than done:
We note that, as plaintiffs carefully heed the admonition to support "legal conclusions"
with factual allegations-lest they be deemed "conclusory" and therefore denied a
presumption of truthfulness, Ashcroft v. lqbal-trialjudges, and appellate judges who
review their determinations, are constantly faced with the task of evaluating competing
inferences to be drawn from those facts. In this sense, Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly have rendered even more important (and more difficult) both trial judges'
adherence to the most fundamental pleading principles-namely, accepting as true all
factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences from those facts in plaintiffs'
favor-and appellate judges' subsequent de novo review of the decisions of the district
courts.

Id. at 429 n. 10 (citations omitted).
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deficient because it failed to allege facts showing the defendants purposefully
adopted a discriminatory detention policy.177
In so ruling, the Court not only rejected the argument that Twombly should
be limited to antitrust complaints, A but also rejected the argument that Twombly
should be tempered in light of the Second Circuit's directive to cabin discovery
so as to preserve the defense of qualified immunity. 179 The Court observed that
permitting this case to proceed to discovery would exact a heavy toll on
government officials, forcing them simultaneously to defend their case and carry
out their official duties.' 80 In particular, litigation "exacts heavy costs in terms
of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government."
Thus, as in Twombly, the Court's rationale for dismissing the complaint is
closely tied to substantive law. In Twombly, the Court ruled that careful scrutiny
of antitrust complaints at the motion to dismiss stage is necessary to filter
insubstantial claims out of the system and to spare defendants from spending
substantial sums of money on discovery to defend claims that cannot possibly
succeed at trial. 182 Similarly, in Iqbal, the Court called for careful scrutiny of
civil rights claims against senior government officials.' 83 Also, forcing
government officials to comply with even minimal discovery would impose
significant burdens that would likely interfere with the execution of official

duties. 184
IV.

THEMES OF THE TWOMBLY TRILOGY

From the Twombly Trilogy, several important themes emerge which shed
light on the standards for reviewing a complaint at the motion to dismiss stage:
(1) trial judge as gatekeeper; (2) pleadings matter; (3) cost matters; (4) context
matters; and (5) greater leeway for courts in evaluating complaints.
A.

Gatekeeper Role

In holding that dismissal was the preferred vehicle for handling complaints
that failed the plausibility test,' 85 Twombly and Iqbal directed trial courts to act
as gatekeepers and to take a hard look at the pleadings before opening the doors
to expensive pretrial discovery. The assignment of yet another gatekeeper role to

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
Id. at 1953.
Id. at 1953-54.
Id. at 1953.
Id.
Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
Id. at 1953.
See supra text accompanying notes 148, 164-171.
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the trial judge is consistent with the trend that began nearly a quarter of a century6
ago aimed at screening out cases unworthy of trial. In its 1986 Matsushita1
decision, the Supreme Court, in an effort to revitalize summary judgment,
directed the trial courts to carefully examine the pleadings and the pretrial record

to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact necessitating a trial and to
87
Matsushita
the
grant summary judgment if there is not.1..
trus
188
. demythologized
.

notion that somehow summary judgment was inappropriate in antitrust cases.

Seven years later, in Daubert,189 the High Court tasked trial judges with

screening out junk science in the courtroom by making sure, prior to trial, that
expert testimony was both relevant and reliable. 90 By pushing the process for
vetting experts and their opinion back into the pretrial phase, Daubert would

save time at trial and eliminate ancillary disputes. More importantly, exclusion
of expert testimony could be outcome determinative and thus eliminate the need
for trial altogether. 191
In 2003, the Supreme Court promulgated amendments to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involving class actions,192 which brought about
193

subtle, but nevertheless significant, changes in class certification procedures.
Recognizing that the granting or denying of class certification had significant
consequences for the litigation, and effectively could be outcome determinative,

the amended rules encouraged courts to consider the issues thoughtfully and not
rush the certification decision.194 The interpretive cases have held that in ruling

on certification issues, the trial court must engage in "rigorous analysis."' 195 A

186. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
187. See id. at 585-88,597-98.
188. See id. at 588. In so holding, the Court implicitly rejected the view that its earlier holding
in Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 474 (1962) was meant to limit the use of summary judgment in
antitrust cases generally.
189. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
190. Id. at 589.
191. See, e.g., Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming
the grant of summary judgment where expert affidavit was inadmissible under Daubert analysis).
192. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 538 U.S. 1083, 1087 (2003).
193. See id. (Amended Rule 23(c)(1)(A) required that "When a person sues or is sued as a
representative of a class, the court must-at an early practicable time--determine by order whether
to certify the action as a class action.").
194. See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23 app. 7, at 24 (Daniel R.
Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997) (providing the Advisory Committee notes to amended Rule 23).
The amended Rule provides that the certification decision be made "at an early practicable time"
instead of "as soon as practicable after commencement of an action" in the prior rule. Id. The
drafters recognized that it may take time to "gather information necessary" to making the
certification ruling, to determine which issues can be tried on a class-wide basis, and to designate
class counsel. Id.
195. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161); Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v.
Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc., 601 F.3d 1159, 1180 (lth Cir. 2010); In re New Motor
Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Smilow v. Sw. Bell
Mobile Sys. Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2003)); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552
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court must make findings that the pre-requisites for certification have been met;
it is not enough that a party has made a "threshold showing" of compliance or
that it intends to meet the requirements of Rule 23.196 In making its findings, the
court may have to resolve factual issues and may not avoid that exercise merely
because of a concern that certification issues overlap with merits issues.
Moreover, where a Rule 23 requirement relies on a novel or complex theory as
to injury, the trial judge must engage in a "searching inquiry" as to the viability
of that theory and the existence of facts necessary for the theory to succeed.
In short, resolution of class certification issues may require significant factfinding well in advance of trial. 199
Viewed against this backdrop of developments in summary judgment, expert
testimony, and class certification, Twombly might be seen simply as the next
logical step in a progression through which dispositive decisions are rendered
ever earlier on the litigation timeline in order to reduce overall costs and to filter
out insubstantial claims from trial dockets.200 That Twombly and Iqbal are part
of a discernable trend does not necessarily mean that these decisions are wise.
Indeed, both the logic of the Twombly decision and the direction in which it
points the federal courts are troubling. 20 1 Twombly is illogical because the Court

F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec.
Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 33 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161).
196. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 307 ("In deciding whether to certify
a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the district court must make whatever factual and legal inquiries
are necessary and must consider all relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties. In
this appeal, we clarify three key aspects of class certification procedure. First, the decision to
certify a class calls for findings by the court, not merely a 'threshold showing' by a party, that each
requirement of Rule 23 is met. Factual determinations supporting Rule 23 findings must be made
by a preponderance of the evidence Second, the court must resolve all factual or legal disputes
relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the merits-including disputes touching on
elements of the cause of action. Third, the court's obligation to consider all relevant evidence and
arguments extends to expert testimony, whether offered by a party seeking class certification or by a
party opposing it.") (citations omitted).
197. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) ("Frequently that 'rigorous
analysis' will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claim. That cannot be
helped.").
198. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 26 (1st Cir. 2008) ("We
do not need to resolve now whether 'findings' regarding the class certification criteria are ever
necessary, but we do hold that when a Rule 23 requirement relies on a novel or complex theory as to
injury, as the predominance inquiry does in this case, the district court must engage in a searching
inquiry into the viability of that theory and the existence of the facts necessary for the theory to
succeed.").
199. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161).
200. See Miller, supra note 43, at 9-10.
201. See Miller, supra note 43, at 47 ("[Tjhe increased risk of dismissal and the resources
needed to defend against it may deter the institution of a potentially meritorious case.").
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proposes that complex cases be choked off at the motion to dismiss stage, the
202

very point at which the courts know least about their cases .
Equally troubling is that the Court-at a time when district courts are
203
starving for trial activity in civil cases -appears to be re-embracing the long
merits. 2 4
discredited common law philosophy of avoiding trial on the
Scholars 205 and judges 206 have bemoaned the "vanishing" civil trial-reflecting
the sharp decline in federal civil trials over the last 50 years. In his 2004 study,
Professor Marc Galanter concluded that "[t]he portion of federal civil cases
,,207
He
resolved by trial fell from 11.5 percent in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002.
also concluded that at least part of this decline in overall civil trials is due to
increased summary judgment activity. 208 Similar empirical data on the effect of
Daubert,class certification decisions, and Twombly on the number of civil trials

are difficult to come by; but Twombly presents yet another hurdle that has to be
negotiated on the road to trial. As one class action lawyer confided in me, a
29
class action plaintiff has to win its case four times before it even gets to trial. 0
An important, but little discussed, spillover effect of the vanishing trial is that
bench and bar become less skilled at trying cases and those cases that do get
210
This lack of experience
tried are not litigated as well as they might have been.
21

further contributes to the declining number of trials.

1

A second spillover effect of the vanishing civil trial is the increasing
212
The nature and scope of
disconnect between discovery and proof at trial.
213
With the
pretrial discovery was once shaped by the issues to be tried.

vanishing civil trial, that overarching structure has disappeared.

214

Pretrial

202. See Miller, supra note 43, at 51 ("The decision as to whether [a case] can proceed will be
based solely on one document, without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to unlock the doors of
discovery.").
203. See Miller, supra note 43, at 8-9.
204. See Miller, supra note 43, at 12.
205. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federaland State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004).
206. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola
University School of Law, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1405
(2002).
207. Galanter, supra note 205, at 459. See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape
of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 518 (2010). But see Higginbotham, supra note 206,
at 1419 (suggesting no discernible rate of change in summary judgment grants between 1981 and
1997).
208. Galanter, supra note 205, at 483.
209. A successful class action plaintiff must win (1) a motion to dismiss; (2) a class
certification motion; (3) a Daubert motion; and (4) a summary judgment motion just to get to trial.
210. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60
DUKE L.J. 745, 755 (2010).
211. Id. at 755-56.
212. See id. at 750.
213. See Higginbotham, supra note 206, at 1417-18.
214. See id.
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discovery has become an end in itself. 215 Discovery, after all, is timeconsuming, and therefore, lucrative for attorneys billing by the hour.2 16 Under
these circumstances, the tendency is to seek more, not less, discovery, and the
more pretrial discovery sought, the higher the cost of litigation. 217 Equally
important, lawyers who lack trial experience-and, perhaps, the vision to see the
interconnection between discovery and proof at trial-are likely to exercise less
discipline in the conduct of discovery. 218 The focus of inexperienced trial
2 19
lawyers tends to be what they can get on discovery, instead of what they need.
Inevitably, this need-insensitive approach also leads to higher discovery costs.
B. In Pleading,FactsMatter (Conclusions Don't)
Twombly and Iqbal represent a retrenchment from the liberal pleading
practices envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules as originally
promulgated. 220 As discussed above, the overarching goal of the Federal Rules
was that meritorious claimants should have their day in court. 22 The drafters
were of the view that hypertechnical pleading rules at common law or under the
222
codes had effectively derailed meritorious claims prior to trial.
Their solution
was to demote the role of the pleadings in federal litigation by de-emphasizing
223
their factual content and underscoring their notice function.
Technical
proficiency was not required. 224 A complaint could pass muster even if it did not
recite all the elements of the cause of action, as long as it described the events
and occurrences
giving rise to the claim. 225 The facts could be developed on
226
discovery.

Under Twombly, however, facts do matter. The Court stated that "[w]ithout
some factual allegations in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the
claim, but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests. 227 To withstand a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough factual matter" to make out a claim
that is "plausible.' 228
Plausibility has both qualitative and quantitative
dimensions. Qualitatively, "conclusory" allegations, "naked assertions, ' 229 and

215. See id.

216.
'217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See id. ("[T]he virtual disconnect between pre-trial and trial has been institutionalized.").
Higginbotham, supra note 210, at 750.
Id. (citing Higginbotham, supra note 206, at 1417).
Id.
See Miller, supra note 43, at 9-10.
See supra text accompanying note 53.
See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 22, § 68, at 467.

223. See id.
224. See id.

225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).
228. Id. at 556.
22§. Id. at 557.
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"formulaic recitations ' 23° do not count and can be ignored on a motion to
dismiss. 23 1Despite the fact that history has shown that attempting to distinguish
232
the lower courts have
"facts" from "conclusions" is an unproductive exercise,
23 3
Iqbal.
and
Twombly
after
readily embraced this task
The next step is for the court to determine whether the remaining wellpleaded facts make out a plausible claim, i.e., whether the factual allegations are
"enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
''234
In the wake
that all the [well-pleaded] allegations in the complaint are true.
of Twombly and Iqbal, the lower courts have struggled to determine the meaning
of "plausible., 235 On the one hand, by retiring Conley, the Supreme Court
236
On the other
clearly intended to raise the bar for pleadings in federal court.
237
Twombly made clear
hand, it is not clear how much the bar has been raised.
23
and by
that the Court was not abandoning notice pleading for fact pleading,
reaffirming Swierkiewicz, the Court eschewed any particularity-in-pleading
requirement under Rule 8.239 Twombly also made clear that on a motion to
dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint,

230. Id. at 555.
231. Id. at 555-57.
232. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 22, § 68, at 467.
233. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2010)
(finding deficient and conclusory, allegations that "visco-elastic foam mattresses comprise a
relevant product market, or submarket, separate and distinct from the market for mattresses
generally, under the federal antitrust laws"); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 326
(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting "conclusory averments"); Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply
Int'l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 255 (3d Cir. 2010) (assertions of conspiracy allegations in a "conclusory
manner" are deficient); Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 318 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010)
(conclusions "are not entitled to the assumption of truth" (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949-50 (2009))); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 258
(4th Cir. 2009) ("bare allegation proves nothing"); Summer v. Cunningham, No. 3:10-CV-169,
2011 WL 52554, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2011) ("[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed me accusation [is insufficient]." (quoting lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959)).
234. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
235. See, e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (courts are "still
struggling" with the question of how much higher Twombly set the bar for pleadings); Moss v. U.S.
Secret Serv., 577 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Much confusion accompanied the lower court's
initial engagement with Twombly."); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)
("We are not the first to acknowledge that the new formulation is less than pellucid."); Phillips v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) ("The issues raised by Twombly are not easily
resolved, and likely will be a source of controversy for years to come."). Compare Kendall v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (Twombly
abrogated notice-pleading in antitrust cases), and ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d
46, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (after Twombly, Rule 12(b)(6) has "more heft"), with Aktieselskabet AF 21.
November 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Twombly leaves the
longstanding fundamentals of noticed pleading intact.").
236. Swanson, 614 F.3d at 403.
237. Id.
238. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
239. Id. But see Ward, supra note 13, at 900 ("Courts 'talk' notice pleading, but often require
more-whether authorized to do so by the Federal Rules or a statute or not.").
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even if the "savvy judge" might disbelieve them. 240 Nor did the Supreme Court
purport to alter the legal axiom that allegations in a complaint are to be read as a
whole and not in isolation. 241 In light of these facts, one can surely argue that
not much has changed after Twombly.
Twombly's conflicting cross-currents are "not easily resolved. 242 The lower
courts have articulated the plausibility requirement in various ways: (1) "some
showing sufficient to justify moving the case beyond the pleadings to the next
stage of litigation"; 243 (2) "a right to relief above the speculative level" ;24 (3)
"plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief'; 245 and (4)
"factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. '' 24 6

Oddly, in purporting to

construe Twombly, the courts have engaged in the very type of labeling that
Twombly decried.

C. Context Matters

Plausibility also involves a quantitative component.

How much factual

detail is required to cross the plausibility threshold? Iqbal held that to determine

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a court must engage in a
"context-specific" analysis and "draw on its judicial experience and common
' 247
sense.
While athan
complaint
need not contain
factual allegations, '' 248 it
requires "more
an unadorned,
the "detailed
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

240. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The exception, of course, is that courts can disregard facts
"that are sufficiently fantastic [so as] to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or
the plaintiff's recent trip to Pluto, or experience in time travel." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Rosenman Family, LLC v. Picard, 395 F. App'x 766,
768 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir.
2007)).
241. See generally Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1982)
("[A] llegations of a complaint must 'be read as a whole'...." (quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 41, § 1363, at 116)).
242. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Matson v. Bd.
of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) ("While a complaint need not contain 'detailed factual
allegations,' it requires 'more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation."' (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949)); Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th
Cir. 2008) (plausibility suggests that plaintiff has a right to relief that goes beyond a "speculative
level" (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)));
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (a complaint will withstand a motion to
dismiss if plaintiff "plausibly (not just speculatively)" has a claim for relief).
243. Phillips,515 F.3d at 234.
244. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Concentra,496 F.3d at 776).
245. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247.
246. Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting lqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949).
247. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007),
rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)); see also Kuperman supra note 37, at 4.
248. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss1/5

26

Cavanaugh: Making Sense of Twombly

2011]

MAKING SENSE OF TWOMBLY

accusation." 249 Simply put, where there is an alternative, lawful explanation of

defendant's conduct that is as probable as plaintiff's claim of illegality, the claim

250
is implausible and may be dismissed . ° In Twombly, the Court held that the

plaintiff s allegations that defendants' refusal to compete constituted an unlawful
conspiracy were implausible because: 25 1 (1) of the lack of any direct proof of
agreement; 25 (2) refusal to compete is not itself unlawful;253 (3) of the history of
telecommunications, where regulated monopoly-not competition-was the
norm; 254 (4) history resisting competition can be viewed as routine market

conduct; 255 and (5) defendants' conduct was in line "with a wide swath of
rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common
perceptions of the market., 256 Where allegations of conspiracy to violate the
antitrust laws are based on parallel conduct, "they must be placed in a context

that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct
that could just as well be independent action." 257 Put another way, "allegations

deficient if there are 'obvious alternative explanation[s]' for
of conspiracy are 258
the facts alleged.,

Similarly, Iqbal was a complex civil rights case in which the plaintiff, a
Pakistani Muslim detainee, alleged that the Attorney General and Director of the

FBI authorized, and had knowledge of, an unconstitutional policy creating harsh

249. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
250. See id.
251. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 553-54 (citing Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993)).
254. Id. at 567-68.
255. Id. at 568.
256. Id. at 554.
257. Id. at 557. In a footnote, the Court described three examples of parallel conduct that
would make claims of conspiracy plausible: (1) "[Plarallel behavior that would probably not result
from chance, coincidence, independent responses to common stimuli or mere interdependence
unaided by an advance understanding among the parties," id. at 556 n.4 (quoting 6 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 1425, at 167 (Aspen Law & Business 2d ed. 2002)); (2) "[C]onduct
[that] indicates the sort of restricted freedom of action and sense of obligation that one generally
associates with agreement," id. (alteration in original) (quoting Michael D. Blechman, Conscious
Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the
Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 881, 899 (1979)); (3) "[C]omplex and historically
unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by multiple competitors, and
made for no other discernible reason... " Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.4. (quoting Brief for
Respondents at 37, Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL
3089915. See also Reply Brief for Petitioners at 12, Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 1491258 ("[O]ne would not expect several competitors to adopt a
'complex and historically unprecedented change[] in pricing' simultaneously and spontaneously.")
(alteration in original).
258. In re Ins. Brokers Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 322-23 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
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259
imprisonment on the basis of plaintiffs race, religion and national orign.
Asserting qualified immunity, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. 26
Dismissing the complaint, the Court held that although the allegations of
plaintiff's arrest and detention were consistent with discriminating intent, the
more likely explanation for defendants' conduct-intent to detain aliens who
were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to
those who committed terrorist acts-rendered the claims of discrimination
implausible.26 1 In addition, the Court pointed out that "disruptive discovery '262
would force expenditure of resources "that might otherwise be directed to the
proper execution of the work of the Government" 263 and might deter or detract
2
officials "from the vigorous performance of their duties." 264

In Erickson, on the other hand, the Court upheld the complaint.

There, the

civil rights claim was straightforward and uncomplicated. 266 The plaintiff was
proceeding pro se. 267 Discovery costs were likely to be minimal and litigation of
the claim would not have created a significant diversion of monetary resources
or state personnel. 268 National security concerns were not relevant, nor were
there concerns about false positives. There was also no obvious alternative and
lawful explanation for the facts alleged.
In short, context matters. 269 What emerges from these three Supreme Court
cases is a kind of sliding scale for determining plausibility, i.e., whether a
complaint will survive a motion to dismiss. 270 As the Seventh Circuit has stated,

259. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1951.
262. Id. at 1953 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1954.
265. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94-95 (2007).
266. See id. at 90-91.
267. Id. at 94. Twombly's plausibility standard is flexible and does not alter the court's
hospitable approach to pro se complaints. Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 213-14 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94).
268. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1555, 1617 (2003).
269. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d. Cir. 2008) ("Context matters in
notice pleading. Fair notice under Rule 8(a)(2) depends on the type of case-some complaints will
require at least some factual allegations to make out a 'showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."' (quoting Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))). But see Maurice E.
Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1472
(2009) (the plausibility test "seems completely subjective," and "to say that pleading requirements
are 'contextual' does not much advance the inquiry or practice.").
270. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2008) ("If
discovery is likely to be more than usually costly, the complaint must include as much factual detail
and argument as may be required to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim."); Austen v.
Catterton Partners V, LP, 709 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (D. Conn. 2010) ("Context, good judgment and
common sense mattered long before the Supreme court decided Twombly and Iqbal, and they
remain significant in deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions even after those decisions."); Schwartz &
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"the height of the pleading requirement is relative to the circumstances."

271

For

example, in a straightforward personal injury case, pleadings modeled after the
Official Forms in the Appendix to the Rules will suffice. 272 However, in "a
complex antitrust or RICO case a fuller set of factual allegations than found in
the sample complaints in the civil rules' Appendix of Forms may be necessary to
show the plaintiffs claim is not 'largely groundless.' ' ' 273 On the one hand, in
antitrust conspiracy cases where the complaint alleges direct evidence of an

agreement, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss without setting forth
significant additional factual enhancements. 274 On the other hand, where the
plaintiff seeks to infer conspiracy from parallel business behavior without
allegations of direct agreements, additional allegations27are required to render the
conspiracy plausible at the motion to dismiss stage.
277

Thus, in Starr v. Sony

27

BMG Music Entertainment, 6 the Second Circuit upheld an antitrust price-fixing
conspiracy complaint 277 containing the following factual enhancements:
1. Defendants, through the creation of two joint ventures, controlled

about 80% of the Internet music business and used the joint
ventures, as well as trade association meetings, to exchange price
information. 8

2.

The prices charged by defendants for Internet music were
unreasonably high and did not reflect the enormous savings over

distribution of music via CDs, nor were terms of sale consumer
friendly.279

3. Third parties, whom defendants used to distribute Internet music,
had to sell to consumers on the same terms as defendants.28 °
4. Defendants used Most Favored Nation clauses in dealing with their
joint ventures and tried to hide this fact, lest they attract antitrust

scrutiny.281

Appel, supra note 57, at 1127 ("Factual specificity is a matter of degree, the demands of which may
change depending on the case.").
271. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009).
272. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding a Federal
Employers' Liability Act complaint that complied with the FED. R. CIv. P.'s Appendix of Forms).
273. Limestone Dev., 520 F.3d at 803 (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32).
274. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32-33 (D.D.C.
2008).
275. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
276. 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010).
277. Id. at 323 ("[Tjhe present complaint succeeds where Twombly's failed because the
complaint.., plausibly suggest[s] that the parallel conduct alleged was the result of an agreement
among the defendants.").
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 319.
281. Id. at 319, 324.
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5. Defendants agreed to sell music at a wholesale price of seventy
cents per song at a time when rival independent sellers charged
twenty-five cents per song.282
6. Defendants jointly agreed not to deal with eMusic, the second
largest Internet music retailer. 283
7. Defendants were
284 subject to at least three governmental antitrust

investigations.

8. Defendants jointly agreed to raise their price of Internet music from
sixty-five cents to seventy cents per song.285
Other courts have rejected conspiracy claims based on parallel conduct
unless at least one "plus factor" is alleged.
Outside of the antitrust area, courts have upheld tort complaints that comply

with the Official Forms appended to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Some courts have gone so far as to suggest that a federal complaint must set
forth all of the elements of the cause of action, 288 but this is clearly at odds with
Twombly. 289 Determining whether the claim is plausible in the factual context in
which it is raised, so as to warrant discovery, is a labor-intensive task.290 A
complaint may well contain a range of allegations, some plausible, others

282. Id. at 324.
283. Id. at 323.
284. Id. at 324.
285. Id. at 323.
286. See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 323 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[P]lus
factors are by definition, facts that 'tend[] to ensure that courts punish concerted action-an actual
agreement-instead of the unilateral independent conduct of competitors."' (quoting In re Flat
Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004))); see also id. at 322 (complaint needs to
allege "something plausibly suggest[ive of] (not merely consistent with) agreement" (alteration in
original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
287. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding employer
negligence claim where complaint alleged status consistent with Form 13).
288. E.g., Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 45657 (6th Cir. 2011) ("'[T]he complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting
all material elements' of the offense." (quoting In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 583
F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009))); Phillips v. Bell, 365 F. App'x 133, 141 (10th Cir. 2010) (a
complaint must include "the necessary elements for a cause of action"); Summer v. Cunningham,
No. 3:10-CV-169, 2011 WL 52554, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2011) ("[A] complaint must contain
allegations supporting all material elements of the claims." (citing Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
520 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2008))).
289. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (Rule 8(a)(2) "requires only 'a short plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'"); see also Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202,
212 (2d Cir. 2008) (a complaint need not "allege specific facts establishing a primafacie case of
discrimination" (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002))).
290. See Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the difficult
task of the court in deciding whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss) (citing Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 & n. 2 (4th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59)).
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fanciful or ungrounded. 291 All of this must be sorted out by the courts. That
[itself] out
process is seldom easy. On the other hand, a party "can [easily] plead
2
claim."
legal
no
has
[it]
that
show
that
facts
pleading
by
court
of
D. Cost Matters
The outcome in Twombly is inextricably linked to the high cost of litigation,
specifically the high cost of discovery in antitrust cases. 2 "
Twombly "is
designed to spare defendants the expense of responding to bulky, burdensome
discovery unless the complaint provides enough information to enable an
inference that the suit has sufficient merit to warrant putting the defendant to the
burden of responding to at least a limited discovery demand." 294 The Court
admonished trial judges considering motions to dismiss not "to forget that
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive." 295 The Court also feared
that litigants could use high discovery costs as a lever to extract significant

settlements from defendants,

irrespective of the merits of the case. 296

Accordingly, deficiencies in claims should "be exposed at the
29 point of minimum
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.
Nor was the Court concerned solely about costs in terms of dollars, ruling
that deficiencies in claims must be exposed at the motion to dismiss stage
because otherwise, "'a largely groundless' claim [would] be [permitted] to take
up the time of a number of people, with the right to do so representing an in
terrorem increment of the settlement value. ,298 Similarly, the Court in Iqbal

291. Id. The Seventh Circuit described the task:
[S]uppose some of the plaintiffs factual allegations are unrealistic or nonsensical and
others not, some contradict others, and some are "speculative" in the sense of implausible
and ungrounded. The district court has to consider all these features of a complaint en
route to deciding whether the complaint has enough substance to warrant putting the
defendant to the expense of discovery ....
Id. (citing Francis,588 F.3d at 193 & n.2; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59).
292. Id. (citing Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 588 (7th Cir. 2009); Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.2d 1074, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d
773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007); Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Orthman v. Apple
River Campground, 757 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 1985)).
293. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59).
294. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2010).
295. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. But see In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 587
F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 n.3 (D.D.C 2008) ("Yet as sensitive as courts must be to the cost to litigants of
discovery, where plaintiffs have made out a plausible antitrust claim .... they are entitled to
discovery in order to determine to what relief, if any, they are entitled.").
296. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
297. ld. at 558 (quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 1216, at 234) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
298. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)).
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opined that the burden of defending deficient civil rights claims could hinder
299
public officials in carrying out their assigned duties.
Courts have heeded Twombly's admonishment to be mindful of discovery

costs in evaluating pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage. The Seventh Circuit
has ruled that where anticipated discovery costs are unusually high, the trial

court may require more factual detail in assessing plausibility. °° Courts have
also been mindful of discovery costs in assessing threshold issues, such as
standing and antitrust injury.3 ° '

Yet, no court has dismissed a claim, without

considering the allegations in the complaint, solely because the cost of discovery
might be high. 302 Moreover, the courts have recognized that once a complaint

passes muster, plaintiffs are entitled to discovery and that discovery may reveal
"evidence that further tilts the balance in favor of liability. 30 3 Finally, Twombly
should not be read
as a blanket bar to discovery prior to the resolution of a
3 4
motion to dismiss.
V.

0

ANALYTICAL HOLES IN

A.

TWOMBLY

AND IQBAL

Fact v. Conclusion

Iqbal reaffirmed the Twombly ruling that in considering the sufficiency of a
complaint on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court need only
consider properly alleged facts and can ignore allegations that are

299. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
300. Limestone Dev. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[Tlhe
complaint must include as much factual detail and argument as may be required to show that the
plaintiff has a plausible claim."). Accord Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir.
2008) (quoting Limestone Dev., 520 F.3d at 803-04); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Continuing
Evolution of Securities Class Actions Symposium: Pleading and the Dilemma of "General Rules,"
2009 Wis. L. REv. 535, 548 (2009) (citing Limestone Dev., 520 F.3d at 803).
301. Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009)
(noting that the Supreme Court "warned particularly of the high costs and frequent abuses
associated with antitrust discovery, before beginning its analysis of whether the alleged market is
cognizable under antitrust laws" (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558)); NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507
F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558) (granting motion to dismiss on
lack of standing); see Warfield Phila., L.P. v. Nat'l Passenger R.R. Corp., No. 09-1002, 2009 WL
4043112, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2009) (dismissal based on insufficient factual support for an
antitrust injury).
302. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 n.3 (D.D.C.
2008) ("[Ais sensitive as [the] courts must be to the cost to litigants of discovery, where plaintiffs
have made out a plausible antitrust claim ....they are entitled to discovery in order to determine to
what relief, if any, they are entitled.").
303. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig. 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010); see also In re
Fla. Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 746 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1317-18 n.23 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(ruling that allegations in the complaints "are specific enough to reduce [the potentially] enormous
discovery burden that concerned the Supreme Court in Twombly").
304. In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., No. C 06-07417 WHA MDL No. 1826,
2007 WL 2127577, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007).
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"conclusory, '3 5 "formulaic, '
or "bare. '3 ° 7 The Court offered no analytic
taxonomy to distinguish between "fact" and "conclusion," as if the differences
were self-defining. The reality is, however, that it is very difficult in practice 3to8
devine the difference between a factual allegation and a conclusory allegation.

0

A rule that makes the validity of an allegation turn on such a distinction is most
unfortunate because it shows that the Court has not learned some important
lessons of history.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which superseded the codes and their

fact-pleading regimen,
make no mention of any distinction between "facts" and
3°9
"conclusions."

The Rules specifically state that "no technical form [of
pleading] is required., 310 On the other hand, facts were at the center of the code
pleading universe. 31' The codes required that a complaint plead facts "sufficient

305. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
306. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
307. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
308. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 57 (2010)
("One of the primary shortcomings of Code pleading was the distinction between 'ultimate' facts,
which were required to be pleaded, and 'evidentiary' facts and 'conclusions of law,' which were not
to be pleaded. Those distinctions proved unworkable in practice and resulted in a level of
technicality and factual detail in the pleadings that became counter-productive.") (footnotes
omitted); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 57, at 1114 ("In practice, the difficulty in distinguishing
between operative facts, evidentiary facts, and legal conclusions made code pleading a spectacular
failure. Like its common law predecessor, code pleading proved immensely technical, and
uncertainty in what needed to be pled to give sufficient notice to a party quickly devolved into an
overly-inclusive approach to pleading. In the end, the system was 'excruciatingly slow, expensive,
and unworkable."' (quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 1202, at 94-95)). See also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 590 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing plaintiffs' allegations in the instant
case to Official Form 9, and concluding that "'[diefendants entered into a contract' is no more a
legal conclusion than 'defendant negligently drove'); United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n
of Chi., 347 U.S. 186, 188 (1954) (holding, in an antitrust case, that the Government's allegations of
effects on interstate commerce must be taken into account in deciding whether to dismiss the
complaint "[wihether these charges be called 'allegations of fact' or 'mere conclusions of the
pleader"'); Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d 353, 354 (7th Cir. 1992) ('The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure establish a system of notice pleading rather than of fact pleading,.., so the happenstance
that a complaint is 'conclusory,' whatever exactly that overused lawyer's clich6 means, does not
automatically condemn it."); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 3-4 (9th
Cir. 1963) ("[Olne purpose of Rule 8 was to get away from the highly technical distinction between
statements of fact and conclusions of law .... "); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v.
Delta Ref. Co., 277 F.2d 694, 697 (6th Cir. 1960) ("Under the notice system of pleading established
by the Rules of Civil Procedure,... the ancient distinction between pleading 'facts' and
'conclusions' is no longer significant.") (citation omitted); 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41,
§ 1218, at 267 ("[T]he federal rules do not prohibit the pleading of facts or legal conclusions as long
as fair notice is given to the parties."). See generally Twombly, 550 U.S. at 589-90 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ('The Court's dichotomy between factual allegations and 'legal conclusions' is the stuff
of a bygone era. That distinction was a defining feature of code pleading, but was conspicuously
abolished when the Federal Rules were enacted in 1938.").
309. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 3-4 (9th Cir. 1963).
310. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d).
311. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 19, at 131 (2d
ed. 1947).
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to constitute a cause of action." 312 The Achilles' heel of code pleading became
manifest when courts got bogged down on the fact/conclusion distinction in
reviewing the pleadings and lost sight of the larger goals of litigation-the just
resolution of meritorious claims. 31 3 The genius of the Federal Rules was that the

drafters avoided this pitfall by adept use of language, eliminating any references
to "facts" or "conclusions" or "cause of action" 314 and simply required a "claim
showing that [a] pleader is entitled to relief., 315 Unfortunately, Iqbal is a step
backwards. In asserting that the trial court's first task in reviewing a complaint
is to screen out conclusory allegations, 316 lqbal thrusts litigants and courts right
3 17

back into the thicket that existed prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules.

312. Id. (quoting STATE OF N.Y. COMM'RS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS, FIRST REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS §§ 120, 122, 127, at 179-80 (1848)).
313. Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460 (1941-43) (detailed pleading under the codes was
"at best wasteful, inefficient and time-consuming, and at most productive of confusion as to the real
merits of the cause of action and even of actual denial of justice").
314. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909,976 (1987) ("The language ultimately
adopted of claim entitling relief avoided the distrusted 'facts' and 'cause of action' language."). See
generally Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. at 462 (extolling the virtues of simplified pleadings). But
see Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 276 (1952) ("Opponents of a change in Rule 8 as
presently construed stress the difficulty of distinguishing between 'ultimate fact' and 'evidentiary
facts' and between 'ultimate fact' and 'conclusions of law'. [sic] They assume that by adopting a
new name, 'claim for relief, [sic] in place of the old, 'cause of action', [sic] these difficulties
vanish. It may be granted that the difficulties sometimes exist. But they are inherent in the
materials with which the law must deal. Supplanting 'cause of action' by 'claim of relief' and then
construing 'claim for relief, [sic] as no more than a notice of disaffection on the part of the plaintiff
do not spirit difficulties away. They merely defer the difficulties to a later point in the litigation.
Supplanting the term 'cause of action' by 'claim for relief' merely indulged a professorial foible and
a common fallacy that changing labels achieves reform. The 'new' pleader points to the many
decisions that grappled with the concept of a cause of action as a reason for abandoning the term.
And so we now have many cases dealing with 'claim for relief. [sic] Nor have we thereby escaped
the basic question which arises in many contexts, such as in the application of res judicata, statute of
limitations, and the like."); Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L. Q. 5, 12
(1938) ("Whether this [elimination of cause of action and facts] will do any good is very doubtful,
for both terms are embedded in the literature of the law and in the vocabulary of the profession.").
315. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 1216, at 207-08
("Conspicuously absent from Federal Rule 8(a)(2) is the requirement found in the codes that the
pleader set forth the 'facts' constituting a 'cause of action.' The substitution of 'claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief for the code formulation of the 'facts' constituting a 'cause of action'
was intended to avoid the distinctions drawn under the codes among 'evidentiary facts,' 'ultimate
facts,' and 'conclusions' and eliminate the unfortunate rigidity and confusion surrounding the words
'cause of action' that had developed under the codes. The draftsmen of the federal rules obviously
felt that the use of a new formulation would emphasize the modem philosophy of procedure
espoused by the federal rules, destroy the viability of the old code precedents, which were a source
of considerable confusion, and encourage a more flexible approach by the courts in defining the
concept of claim for relief.") (footnotes omitted).
316. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007)).
317. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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Worse, Iqbal encourages courts to use the kinds of outcome-determinative labels
decried in Twombly, and licenses courts to arbitrarily engineer outcomes and
ignore inconvenient facts by simply describing them as "conclusions." The
fact/conclusion dichotomy does not provide a workable3 19standard for courts to
adjudge the viability of pleadings on a motion to dismiss.
B.

What Documents Are Properly Before the Court on a Motion to
Dismiss?

Historically, on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim,
only the complaint is properly before the court, and the defendant accepts all
allegations as true for the purposes of the motion. 320 Twombly and Iqbal have
32
substantially eroded this concept, while at the same time paying it lip service. 1
As discussed above, only factual allegations count; conclusory allegations can be
disregarded. 322 Moreover, in both Twombly and Iqbal, the Court obviously
its decisions, piecing together
looked to sources outside the complaint to reach
"rational" explanations of defendants' conduct. 323
In Twombly, the Court, relying on economic theory not part of the record
before it, treated plaintiffs' allegations that the defendants jointly frustrated new
entry by CLECs into their respective territories with the cruel back of its hand,
stating that defendants' resistance was "the natural, unilateral reaction of each
ILEC intent on keeping its regional dominance." 324 Further, the Court held that
"resisting competition is routine market conduct" and that "there is no reason to
infer that the companies had agreed among themselves to do what was only
natural anyway." 3 5 The Court also found that "each ILEC ha[d] reason
to... avoid dealing with CLECs" and "each ILEC would rhave] attempt[ed] to
keep CLECs out, regardless of the" other ILECs' actions. 326
Similarly, regarding plaintiffs' assertions that ILECs agreed among
themselves not to invade each other's territories, the Court ruled that "a natural
explanation for the noncompetition is that the former [g]overnment-sanctioned
monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same. ,,327

318. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
319. See Stucke, supra note 269, at 1472 (criticizing the subjective nature of the plausibility
test).
320. Fletcher v. Burkhalter, 609 F.3d 1091, 1098 (10th Cir. 2010).
321. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 ("We begin our analysis by identifying allegations.., not
entitled to the presumption of truth.").
322. See supra notes 220-233 and accompanying text.
323. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 (observing that ILECs refusals to deal with CLECs could
be viewed as rational business behavior); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (stating that in the aftermath of
the 9/11 attacks, the Attorney General had justifiable reason to detain Muslims illegally in the
United States who might be linked to terrorists).
324. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566.
325. Id.
326. Id.

327. Id. at 568.
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Relying on a treatise, the Court found that, as a matter of fact, "[flirms do not
expand without limit and none of them enters every market that an outside
328
observer might regard as profitable, or even a small portion of such markets.9

The Court remarked that "Congress may have expected some ILECs to become
CLECs in the legacy territories
of other ILECs, but the disappointment does not
329
make conspiracy plausible."

In Iqbal, again, with only the complaint before it, the Court found that in
view of the events of 9/11, arrests overseen by the Director of the FBI were
likely lawful and justified by the intent to detain aliens having a link to the 9/11
attacks. 330 This "obvious alternative explanation" 331 for plaintiffs arrest
made
conclusion." 332

his claim of "invidious discrimination.., not a plausible
At the very least, Iqbal and Twombly authorize, if not encourage, trial courts
to make probabilistic determinations of facts at the motion to dismiss stage.333

328. id. at 569 (quoting 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 307d, at 76 (Supp. 2010)).

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
Id. at 1951-52.
See Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIG., Spring 2009,

at 1.
[fIn a particularly troubling sentence, the Court suggests that a complaint must not only
be consistent with the claim asserted, but must also exclude "more likely explanations."
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951).
What, exactly, does that mean? At a minimum, it appears to be a standard that
invites district court judges to dismiss cases based on their own subjective notions of
what is probably true-a determination that apparently can be made based on events
outside the four corners of the complaint. For example, in Iqbal, the plaintiff-a
Pakistani Muslim-sued numerous government officials asserting violation of various
constitutional rights, alleging that, following the events of September 11, 2001, he was
classified as a "high interest" detainee and held in extremely harsh conditions as a matter
of policy based "solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin, and for
no legitimate penological reason." (quoting lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959). Although
conceding his allegations, taken as true, are consistent with his theory of being classified
as "of high interest" based on race, religion or national origin, the Court nonetheless
found Iqbal's allegations of discriminatory treatment implausible....
Thus, Iqbal has the potential to short-circuit the adversary process by shutting the
doors of federal courthouses around the nation to large numbers of legitimate claims
based on what amounts to a district court judge's effectively irrefutable, subjective
assessment of probable success. This is so notwithstanding a complaint containing wellpled factual allegations that, if allowed to proceed to discovery and proved true at trial,
would authorize a jury to return a verdict in the plaintiffs favor.
Id. at 2 (second alteration in original). See also David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy oflqbal, 99 GEO.
L.J. 117, 137-38 (2010) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d)) ("[T]he apparent simplicity of the Court's
diktat obscures important questions about the adjudication of motions to dismiss after Iqbal. First,
courts are in the business of providing reasons. They do not simply announce decisions, but explain
why they follow from accepted premises. Second, various legal rules governing how a court is
supposed to evaluate a motion to dismiss are designed to limit the information the court may
consider. A court, for example, must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment if the motion presents matters outside the pleadings. For both these reasons, the sources
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This not only preempts the fact-finding function at trial, but also threatens to
fact finding prior to
substitute fact-based decision-making with decision-based
334
trial,contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
C.

Information in Exclusive Control of Defendants

Neither Twombly nor Iqbal directly addresses the question of what should be

done where the facts are in the exclusive control of the defendants or otherwise
not readily available to plaintiffs, thereby putting plaintiffs at a serious
disadvantage at the pleading stage. 335

Iqbal seems to say that whether

information is in the exclusive control of a defendant is irrelevant on a motion to

dismiss. 336 In antitrust conspiracy cases, for example, it is not unusual for the
conspirators to meet and agree covertly and then do whatever is necessary to
cover their tracks.337 Not surprisingly, under those circumstances, the plaintiff

may not have access to facts evidencing agreement prior to the filing of any
complaint. Dismissal for failure to allege facts showing agreement seems unfair,
as does the end-result of letting conspirators go free, because the defendants
were careful enough to conceal the damning evidence. Similarly, in civil rights
cases, discrimination claims are often proven statistically using data in the
exclusive control of defendants and available via discovery only after an action
is filed.338 The fact that the Court did not address the problem of asymmetry of

of information a court relies on to substantiate its 'judicial experience and common sense' are
important. If 'judicial experience and common sense' constitutes a license to rely on broad new
categories of extrinsic information at a motion to dismiss, the critics' fears that motion to dismiss
practice will be unduly influenced by individual judges' differing views of life, the universe, and
everything may be warranted. If, on the other hand, 'judicial experience and common sense'
introduces only a few new premises into courts' analysis, the critics' fears may be overstated.").
334. Cf Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that
Twombly and Iqbal do not require courts "to stack up inferences side by side and allow the case to
go forward only if the plaintiff's inferences seem more compelling than the opposing inferences");
2011)
In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. Cheese Antitrust Litig., 767 F. Supp. 2d 880, 899 (N.D. Ill.
("[T]he inference of an agreement need not be more reasonable than the inference of independent
parallel conduct." (citing Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404)).
335. See Cavanagh, supra note 24, at 889.
336. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1954 ("Because respondent's complaint is deficient under Rule 8,
he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise."); New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville
Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Without discovery, pricing information or any
fact that would support an allegation of illegal economic collusion becomes far harder to obtain.").
337. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1126 n.459 ("Antitrust
conspiracies routinely are inferred from such ambiguous evidence as unexplained secret meetings,
unnatural identity of prices or parallelism of certain conduct, and geographically adjacent
conspiracies.").
338. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Salvaging Civil Rights Claims: How PlausibilityDiscovery
Can Help Restore Federal Court Access After Twombly and Iqbal, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR L. &
POL'Y, Nov. 2010, at 12, available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Malveaux%20issue%20
brief%20-%2OFed%20Access%20after%20Twombly.pdf.
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information, when faced with the very types of cases where asymmetry is not
atypical-Twombly (antitrust) and Iqbal (civil rights)-is troubling.
VI. SYNTHESIS

Based on the foregoing discussion, the following principles of construction
of Rule 8(a)(2) in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal may prove useful to the courts.
A.

Proportionality

The level of factual content in a pleading required by Twombly and Iqbal is
directly proportional to the complexity of the case and the likely costs of pretrial
discovery.
Underlying the call for heightened scrutiny of the complaints 34in
Twombly and Iqbal were the special cost concerns presented in complex cases. 0
In Twombly, the Supreme Court held that defendants should not be forced to
shoulder the heavy financial burdens of pretrial discovery based on threadbare
allegations of a complex antitrust conspiracy coupled with stray claims of
consciously parallel behavior. 341 The Court was also concerned with the cost of

false positives, 342 refusing to condemn conduct "just as much in line with a wide
swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by
common perceptions of the market." 343 In Iqbal, the Court similarly ruled that
forcing the Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI to
defend civil rights claims based on broad allegations that raised no more than the
possibility of wrongdoing would be costly to the public because it would likely

impair the ability of these officials to execute their responsibilities to the
public. 344 The rationale underlying the pleading standards in Twombly and Iqbal
"thus applies where both the cost and the likelihood of false positives are

339. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he height of the pleading
requirement is relative to circumstances."); see also supra note 269 and accompanying text.
340. See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2010)
(reprimanding district courts for misapplying the Twombly standard in complex cases and
encouraging massive discovery); Cooney, 583 F.3d at 971 (noting that the complex circumstances
in Twombly and lqbal led to the heightened pleading standard); Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340
(7th Cir. 2009).
341. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
342. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (False positives-the mistaken inferences of anticompetitive effects-"are especially costly
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect." (quoting Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))); see generally Edward D.
Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 629, 637 (2010) ("[T]he mistaken inference of anticompetitive effect '[is] especially costly,
because [it] chill[s] the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."' (quoting Trinko,
540 U.S. at 414) (alterations in original)).
343. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554.
344. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
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high., 345 On the other hand, where the expected cost is not high, the enhanced
justified." 346
pleading standards implemented in Twombly and Iqbal "[are] not
B. Assuming the Truth of Allegations in the Pleadings

Although neither Twombly nor Iqbal countermand the time honored practice
of assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint on a motion to dismiss,
those cases do, of course, distinguish between well-pleaded allegation of fact,
which must be accepted as true, and mere conclusory allegations, which can be
ignored. 347 Indeed, Iqbal encourages courts, as a first step, to peruse the
pleadings for conclusory statements that can be immediately tossed aside. 348 As
discussed above, 349 that exercise is easier said than done because "the distinction
between a 'conclusion' and a 'fact' is not always easy to discern." 350 It may be
tempting for a court to draw that distinction in the twinkling of an eye.
However, history has taught us that this exercise is at best unproductive, if not
futile, and that is precisely the reason the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
abandoned so-called fact pleading.35' Accordingly, courts must be wary of the
fact/conclusion divide.
This is not to say that every statement in every pleading must be taken as
true. As the court in Austen v. Catterton Partners V, LP observed, "[c]ontext,

good judgment and common sense mattered long before the Supreme Court
decided Twombly and Iqbal .... 352 The court in Austen provides an apt
example of how Twombly and Iqbal should sensibly be applied in passing on the
sufficiency of the complaint without entering the thorny fact/conclusion thicket:
If a plaintiff says that a defendant intended to, and did, punch the
plaintiff in the nose, is that a statement of fact about the defendant's act
and intent, or is it a conclusion since none of us is a mind reader? In
most circumstances, the Court would consider that statement to be one
of fact that the Court would be required to assume is true for purposes of
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. On the other hand, if a plaintiff baldy [sic]
asserts that she was subjected to a "hostile work environment" without
more, the Court would consider that statement be a mere conclusion-in
the parlance of the Supreme Court, a "threadbare recital"-to which the
Court need not defer. In the latter example, further facts would be

345. Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False
Positive Error,20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 66 (2010).
346. Id.
347. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
348. See id.
349. See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
350. Austen v. Catterton Partners V, LP, 709 F. Supp. 2d 168, 171 (D. Conn. 2010).
351. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
352. Austen, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 172.
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needed (and in this example, the plaintiff certainly would know what
environment she had been subjected to) in order to provide adequate
notice to the defendant of the basis for the lawsuit
and to make the
353
plaintiff's hostile work environment claim plausible.
Context, good judgment and common sense-not any quick fact/conclusion
354
bucketing-should decree the court's decision on a motion to dismiss.

C. DistinguishingRule 12 and Rule 56

Twombly's formulation of the pleading standard for antitrust conspiracy
cases draws heavily from summary judgment cases, but the standards for
dismissal applicable on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissal on a motion for
summary judgment remain distinct.355 The Court in Twombly aligned the
356
standards for Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 but declined to merge them.
Moreover, the lower courts have correctly recognized that there may be
situations where allegations of parallel behavior may not be sufficient to get to a
jury, and thus fail on summary judgment, but may be enough to justify further
discovery, and thus defeat a motion to dismiss. 357 Twombly itself supports this

position and would uphold a pleading with "enough fact to raise a reasonable
' 358
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement."
Summary judgment, on the other hand, tests the sufficiency of the claim; the
court has before it not only the pleadings, but also all evidence adduced during
discovery. 359 Even an admittedly well-pleaded antitrust conspiracy complaint
may fall short if plaintiff cannot proffer evidence to support its allegations of
joint activity or defendants
can adduce uncontroverted evidence to undermine
36
the conspiracy claims. 0

353. Id. at 171-72.
354. See id.
355. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 323 n.21 (3d Cir. 2010).
356. See id.
357. Id. ("[Elven in those contexts in which an allegation of [conspiracy based on] parallel
conduct will not suffice to take an antitrust plaintiff's case to the jury, it will sometimes suffice to
overcome a motion to dismiss and permit some discovery, perhaps leaving the issue for later
resolution on a motion for summary judgment." (second alteration in original) (quoting Starr v.
Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 329 (2d Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., concurring))).
358. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
359. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (noting that
summary judgment can only be granted if there is "no genuine issue of material fact"); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (describing the summary judgment standard).
360. See generally Brian Thomas Fitzsimons, The Injustice of Notice & Heightened Pleading
Standards for Antitrust Conspiracy Claims: It Is Time to Balance the Scale for Plaintiffs,
Defendants, and Society, 39 RUTGERs L.J. 199, 199-202 (2007) (discussing how heightened
pleading standards in antitrust cases are negatively impacting putative plaintiffs, especially in the
discovery process).
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D. Special Considerations
Erickson makes clear that Twombly does not alter the federal courts'

361
longstanding policy of liberal pleading standards for pro se complaints.
District courts should similarly be circumspect in considering a motion to
dismiss a complaint in cases where there is an asymmetry of information, as is
frequently the case in antitrust conspiracy and civil rights cases.362 Dismissal is
harsh in such cases precisely because the plaintiffs do not have access to all the
facts. 363 Rather than terminate the litigation with prejudice, the better approach

would be to provide limited and specifically targeted discovery before
entertaining the motion to dismiss. 364 The amount of access and costs thereof

would be governed by the proportionality standards embedded in the Federal
Rules and the sound discretion of the trial court. 365 Similarly, antitrust
complaints in private enforcement actions that are follow-ons to successful
government enforcement actions should be dismissed at the pleading stage on

Twombly grounds only in the most unusual circumstances. 366 The fact that the
government has already been successful in a public enforcement action should
367
In these
allay any fears that the private action might be largely groundless.

circumstances, a poorly drafted complaint is best handled by a remedy other than
dismissal. On the other hand, if a government investigation is merely ongoing
has been filed, the presumption of merit of the private claim would
and no action
36 8
not pertain.

361. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)); see Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d. Cir. 2008).
362. See, e.g., Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010). Ruling that a
defective products claim had been improperly dismissed prior to discovery, Judge Easterbrook
stated:
In applying [the plausibility] standard to claims for defective manufacture of a
medical device in violation of federal law, moreover, district courts must keep in mind
that much of the product-specific information about manufacturing needed to investigate
such a claim fully is kept confidential by federal law. Formal discovery is necessary
before a plaintiff can fairly be expected to provide a detailed statement of the specific
bases for her claim. Accordingly, the district court erred in this case by dismissing
plaintiff's original complaint and by denying her leave to amend her complaint.
Id.
363. See Fitzsimons, supra note 360, at 200.
364. See Cavanagh, supra note 24, at 892.
365. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (giving judges discretion to limit discovery).
366. See generally Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the
Triumph of Milton Handler,and the Uncertain Future of Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REv. LITIG. 1,
31 (2008) (discussing that prior governmental prosecutions indicate merit of claims).
367. Cf In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775(JG)(VVP), MDL
No. 1775, 2009 WL 3443405, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009) ("The additional fact that numerous
defendants have pled guilty to criminal charges of fixing prices on air cargo shipments further
supports that conclusion [of upholding the complaints].").
368. See, e.g., In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2007) (investigation
was not enough to make complaint plausible).
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E. Dismissal Without Prejudice
If the complaint is found deficient on a motion to dismiss, the preferred

remedy is dismissal without prejudice. 369 That is, the plaintiff ordinarily should
be given a second shot at stating a claim. Nevertheless, the trial court should and
does retain the power to dismiss those claims that lack legal merit and cannot be
resuscitated by any amount of pleading. 370
VII. AN

ASSESSMENT

In the short term, Twombly has proven to be neither the death knell to federal

civil litigation, as its critics had feared, nor the quick-fix for the perceived
problem of out-of-control discovery costs and burdensome litigation that the
Court sought to achieve.37 Instead, it has sowed a great deal of confusion

among federal courts as to the meaning of plausibility,372 and, unfortunately, has
shifted the focus to whether a claim is well-pleaded, instead of whether a claim
has merit.373 This is not surprising; the Court has simply chosen the wrong tool.
If the goal is truly to reduce discovery costs, the court needs to address that

problem directly through existing procedural rules already at their disposal that
limit discovery and encourage active pretrial management by trial courts.
Twombly gives short-shrift to this approach. 37 The Court simply throws up
its hands and, somewhat incredulously, asserts that discovery is beyond the
practical ability of the courts to control.375 This assertion ignores developments

369. See In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 07-1827 SI, C 09-5840 SI, MDL
No. 1827, 2010 WL 2610641, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2010) ("The Ninth Circuit has 'repeatedly
held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was
made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other
facts."' (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000))); see also Pefialbert-Rosa v.
Fortuflo-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595-96 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Without trying to lay down a mechanical
rule, it is enough to say that sometimes a threadbare factual allegation bears insignia of its
speculative character and, absent greater concreteness, invites an early challenge-which can be
countered by a plaintiff's supplying of the missing detail."); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983) ("Had the District Court required
the Union to describe the nature of the alleged coercion with particularity before ruling on the
motion to dismiss, it might well have been evident that no violation of law had been alleged. In
making the contrary assumption for purposes of our decision, we are perhaps stretching the rule of
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957), too far. Certainly in a case of this magnitude, a
district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.").
370. See In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 07-1827 SI, C 09-5840 SI, MDL
No. 1827, 2010 WL 2610641, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2010) (quoting Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130).
371. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 235 and 245 and accompanying text.
373. See Bell Atil. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) ("[A] well-pleaded complaint
may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is
improbable .... ).
374. Id. at 559.
375. See id.
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in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over the last three decades that provide
presumptive limits on discovery and empower the trial courts to actively manage
the case by, inter alia, tailoring discovery to the particular
the pretrial phase 37of
6
needs of the case.
Moreover, the Twombly approach has at least three inherent contradictions.
First, it insists on greater factual content in the complaint (and logically more
discovery) while at the same time decrying the runaway costs of pretrial
discovery. 377 Second, it encourages trial judges-the very same trial judges who
cannot effectively control discovery-to dismiss claims at the outset of the
case,378 the time when the court knows least about them. Third, Twombly invites
in every case, thereby increasing, not decreasing, the burdens
motions to dismiss
37 9
on the courts.
In the long term, Twombly is likely to be viewed as a lost opportunity. Its
lasting impact is likely to be at the margins-perhaps a few more dismissals than
would have occurred pre-Twomby and perhaps a bit more detailed pleading by
plaintiffs to combat motions to dismiss in complex cases, at least where the
plaintiff can plead in detail without the benefit of discovery. True cost savings,
however, are not likely to be achieved until the Supreme Court and the district
courts address the problem of excessive discovery costs through the finely tuned
discovery rules already in place. The tools are there; they just need to be
utilized.
on a motion to dismiss, any
If the initial complaint is found deficient
38
0
dismissal order should be without prejudice.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Twombly and Iqbal decisions have not proven to be the de facto death
sentence to federal civil litigation that many had feared. Still, the Court's choice
to use heightened scrutiny of complaints at the motion to dismiss stage as the
vehicle for addressing the problem of excessive discovery costs is puzzling,
especially in light of the availability of existing tools in the Federal Rules
directly addressing the amount and scope of discovery and the collateral damage
that can be inflicted by use of such a blunt instrument to effectuate change.
Accordingly, courts should heed Judge Posner's admonition that Twombly "must
not be overread ' 381 and should remain vigilant to assure preservation of the
fundamental goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-that the pleadings
be construed so as to do justice and ensure that meritorious litigants have their
Courts must also take seriously their case management
day in court.
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381.

See id.
Id. at 558.
Id.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 362.
Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).
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responsibilities and, where appropriate, actively impose the discovery limitations
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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